![]() ![]() In this article, I defend an account of self-knowledge that allows us a considerable first person authority regarding our subjective experiences without invoking privileged access. Email: Self-Knowledge, and Describing One’s Experiences Although there are a number of differences in their ways of thinking concerning the development of the self and social behavior, this paper shows that Foucault and Sartre seem to share Hyppolite’s notion that the fulfillment of the absolute self will always be deferred because of an ongoing contradiction in our social behavior.Ĭorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed to Line Joranger, Associate Professor, Department of Health and Social Sciences, Telemark University College, Kjølnes ring 56, 3918 Porsgrunn, Norway. The physical body is our point of contact with the world, which is a practical world, which we typically engage before any kind of theoretical understanding of what things or people are like. ![]() According to Foucault, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty, intersubjective social relations are physical and bodily connections. The development of the self and behavior toward others were heavily discussed during the French postwar era. Line Joranger, Telemark University College Email: of the Self in Society: French Postwar Thought on Body, Meaning, and Social Behavior In particular, I argue that while epistemic access cannot generate experience from scratch it does play a crucial role in constituting an important form of higher-order experience, namely, the capacity to experience a sense of ownership over one’s experiential domain.Ĭorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed to Itay Shani, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Kyung Hee University, 1 Hoegi dong, Dongdaemun gu, Seoul, 130-701, Korea. Instead, I offer an explanatory framework which takes both sentience and sapience as ontological fundamentals and explore how they co-evolve. In this paper I take issue with this line of thought, arguing that neither of these salient aspects of consciousness reduces to the other. ![]() The connection between these two constitutive aspects - the informational and the phenomenal - is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One influential approach maintains that sentience ultimately reduces to sapience, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is a function of representational relations between mental states which, barring these relations, would not, and could not, be conscious. Knowing How it Feels: On the Relevance of Epistemic Access for the Explanation of Phenomenal ConsciousnessĬonsciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. ![]()
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